The government today released another 130 pages of redacted Richard Colvin documents . Many are redacted so heavily as to be worthless, but even still, these documents paint a clear picture which is in agreement with the testimony of Richard Colvin and contradicts the talking-points the Harper government has been using to attack and discredit Colvin.

I have never before in my 15-year career been told that, internally, we must lie to each other. Richard Colvin

Even a quick scan of the eight megabytes of scanned images (PDF) illustrates ample justification for calling a full public inquiry. Here is a quick extraction from the material:

• Concerns over detainee treatment were reported on by Colvin right from the start of his posting, not only after the Globe and Mail broke the story in spring 2007. Colvin himself alerted Kabul HQ (April 14 2007) that reporter Graeme Smith of the Globe and Mail had been conducting extensive research in preparation for a soon to be released article on torture and Canadian involvement which was "too close for comfort". Still, Colvin's attempts at moving the issue forward appeared to be stonewalled by either DFAIT, the military, or politicians back home or all of the above. For example on May 26, 2006 in memo KANDH0029:

  "[redacted] has been trying for some time to get these concerns taken seriously. [redacted] "very much taken aback by the reaction -- the very strong reaction -- of the Canadian military"

• Colvin's reporting shows a pattern of constant attention to the issue. (Page 10) Sept 19 2006: KBGR0118:

  Afghanistan [redacted] detainee concerns - [redacted] today raised with us an ongoing concern about detainees [redacted]

• Other organizations had reported significant concerns. (Page 13) September 28, 2006 KBGR01

  [redacted] what can only be described as strong criticisms of the Cdn approach on detainee issues. There [redacted] are [redacted.............]

• Concerns about the overall treatment of detainees, including those transferred to Afghan custody by Canadian forces, contradicting comments made by defence minister Peter MacKay, diplomat David Mulroney and three generals who testified before committee (p. 22, p. 24 on page 129)

• More than one year after the Harper government had taken power, detainees still were not being monitored appropriately per agreements with the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission -- agreements that were made not with the former Martin government but with the Harper government in February 2007 (page 56); a key section of this document which apparently discusses Government of Canada awareness of abuse reports from the AIHRC is fully [redacted]. Why is this [redacted]?

• Despite a failure of the arrangements established by the Harper government, prisoner transfers from Canadian to Afghan hands continued (spring 2007). The Harper government via then defence minister Gordon O'Conner and also Prime Minister Harper even trumpeted the agreement as being both "recent" and "sufficient". (pages 56, 57)

• Colvin writes on April 24 2007 that a hastily developed "diplomatic contingency plan", developed ostensibly to address media pressure in Canada, ws "insufficient to address the urgent detainee crisis". (page 62) His recommendations include establishing a Government of Canada capacity to monitor detainees, and a suggestion that the military adjust their operations to reduce the number of detainees being captured and handed over in the first place. Clearly no one is recommending that suspects of a high degree of confidence be set free, so this indicates a somewhat wanton approach to taking prisoners.

• The very next day Colvin writes:

  "detainee methodologies in the field are too expansive, resulting in the detention of a significant number of Afghans who are not/ not insurgents or combatants."

• An observation that feedback from the field was not welcomed by HQ in Ottawa

• Many memos regarding detainees circa April 25 2007 and onward are redacted almost completely, yet the subject matter is of direct concern to the special committee inquiring into this matter.

• On or before April 30 2007 Canada's Ambassador to Afghanistan a the time, Afir Lalani, had personally censored the distribution list of a memo regarding detainee monitoring and, it appears, had played a role in censoring other parts of the document. This seems to indicate that political orders from on high have declared Colvin a dangerous liability. (page 76)

• On May 7 2007 Colvin warns HQ/Ottawa that Globe and Mail reporter Graeme Smith will be publishing a follow up piece "within a few months" and that Smith's reportage was likely to raise serious public-policy questions.

• June 6 2007 embassy staff visit a detention facility in Kabul, intent on interviewing detainees which had been captured by Canadian forces in the Kandahar area. Reports of torture and abuse allegations are included in the memo (page 95)

• June 9 2007, a two and a half page memo on detainees, drafted by Colvin, is completely redacted.

• August 27, a Regional Command South brainstorming session is attended by a variety of nation's forces. Apparently many good ideas are discussed, but they are mostly redacted, and the conclusion in the memo is "we all recognize the problems but how are they to be solved?" Here Canada has been at war, but we don't call it war, for many years and still no reliable approach to detainees (not to mention ultimate justice for same) is in place. Clearly it isn't a priority for anyone who is in power.

• October 24 2007 Colvin writes what many might consider as a "career limiting memo", a conclusion of his time in Afghanistan. In his opinion Canada has not "come to grips" with the detainee problem and recommends that we stop handing detainees over to Kandahar-area Afghan forces. Period.

• In that same farewell memo, perhaps the most startling observation made is the Canadian embassy had made it perfectly clear that all personnel were to lie about the situation in Afghanistan, not just to media but maintain such lies even within their own ranks. This is a clear indication of intent - nothing less than full blown institutional cover-up. Within this memorandum written by Richard Colvin entitled: End-of-posting observations, dated 24 October 2007 and addressed to David Mulroney:

  Management of Afghanistan by DFAIT

  The next day, the point was unambiguously made to the whole embassy that henceforth the official embassy view is that things are getting better. This is completely contradicted by the available data, as well as by the careful assessments [redacted]. I have never before in my 15-year career been told that, internally, we must lie to each other. (page 125) Richard Colvin

It is long past time for an inquiry setting into this matter where perjury is punishable by jail time.

Attached: 130 pages of Colvin and related reports (PDF)